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This work studies an equilibrium selection of inﬁnitely repeated symmetric 2£2
coordination games that show a tension between Pareto eﬃciency and risk domi-
nance, in which bounded rational agents adopt the following simple behavior rule:
each agent has a valuation of actions, and chooses the highest one. Valuations are
updated according to the sign of the diﬀerence between the current valuation and
the realized payoﬀ. By applying techniques from stochastic stable states (Kandori
et al. 1993 and Young 1993), it is shown that the risk dominant outcome is selected;
that is, it is realized more frequently in the long run.
JEL classiﬁcation: C72, D83
Keywords: Satisﬁcing behavior, Coordination game, Stochastic evolutionary game,
Valuation of action1 Introduction
It is not possible to know everything relevant when we face decisions. Generally, the
limited knowledge we have is based on personal experience. If someone succeeds in
gaining relatively higher payoﬀ, he/she would retain that choice of action. Such subjective
valuations of actions are critical factors in maintaining stable situations. Of course, the
outcome of an action depends on the other person’s action, and vice versa.
In this paper, under such patterns of behavior, we examine the equilibrium selection
in a symmetric coordination game. We assume that each player has valuations of possible
actions. If an action is chosen, the valuation of the action is updated according to the
sign of the diﬀerence between current payoﬀ and current valuation of the action. If the
realized payoﬀ of the action exceeds the valuation then the valuation increases; otherwise
it decreases. If both are equal, it does not change. If the valuation of the current action
exceeds the valuation of the alternative, the player chooses the same action next time.
Also, because of the perturbation, the player chooses the undesirable action with small
probability.1
This behavior rule shares basic features with satisﬁcing behavior (Karandikar, Mookher-
jee, Ray and Vega-Redond 1998, In-Koo and Matsui 2005, Kim 1999, Pazgal 1997). The
features of satisﬁcing behavior are summarized as follows: (1) there is one endogenous
parameter (aspiration) that is updated, based on realized payoﬀs, and converges to the
realized payoﬀs.2 (2) players use the parameter to trigger changes of action. In the
present model we have two endogenous parameters (valuations for actions), of which one
converges to the realized payoﬀs. Regarding (2), two endogenous parameters (valuations
1This trembling for choice is also assumed by In-Koo and Matsui (2005) and Pazgal (1997). Con-
versely, Karandikar et al (1998) assume that aspiration is perturbed directly.
2In Pazgal (1997), the endogenous parameter (aspiration) converges to the maximal payoﬀ in past
experience.
1for actions) are used in turn as a reference point.
In the present model, the Risk dominant outcomes are selected in the long run in
the coordination game irrespective of the initial conditions. This is in contrast to the
situation in (Karandikar et al. 1998, Pazgal 1997, Kim 1999), in which the Pareto eﬃcient
outcome is selected under certain conditions.3
This diﬀerence stems from the number of endogenous reference points. In the other
papers, the endogenous reference point is the aspiration level. Based on this reference
point, the action is chosen. In the simple satisﬁcing model (Karandikar et al. 1998), if the
equilibrium outcome is Pareto eﬃcient, the aspiration is higher than the Risk dominant
outcome. It is therefore diﬃcult to move to the Risk dominant outcome. On the other
hand, if the equilibrium outcome is Pareto ineﬃcient (and Risk dominant), the aspiration
is lower than the Pareto eﬃcient outcome and it is easy to move to the Pareto eﬃcient
outcome.
In case-based decision theory (Pazgal 1997, Kim 1999), valuations of actions are cal-
culated at every time. The aspiration level is used as a reference point for the valuations,
and there is a device to maintain the aspiration level high. In Pazgal (1997), it is as-
sumed that aspiration converges to the maximum payoﬀ in the past. Also, if the initial
aspiration level is high enough, players are not satisﬁed with their current situation and
make many experiments in the early periods. The Pareto eﬃcient outcome then occurs
with probability close to 1. In this situation the player is not satisﬁed with the Pareto
ineﬃcient outcome, generating an inclination to Pareto eﬃcient outcomes.
In Kim (1999), let us suppose that the aspiration level is close to the eﬃcient payoﬀ
and the adjustment speed is slow. If the eﬃcient outcome is realized once, the outcome
3In Pazgal (1997), Kim (1999), an initial high aspiration level is needed. The results in Karandikar
et al. (1998) do not depend on the initial conditions, but require suﬃciently slow updating of aspiration.
2then continues. This is because, by the way of making valuations, positive values are
accumulated to the valuation of the eﬃcient action. On the other hand, even if the risk
dominant outcome is realized, the valuation of the risk dominant action becomes less than
that of the eﬃcient action after a ﬁnite period. This is because, with a high aspiration
level, the negative values accumulate to the valuation of the risk dominant action. As a
result of this negative accumulation and slow adjustment, the valuation of risk dominant
action decreases.
In contrast to previous research, players in our model use two reference points in
turn. This weakens commitment to the eﬃcient outcome. This weakening is because the
reference point is a valuation of the other actions, and it cannot maintain a high value.
Hence, the risk dominant outcome comes to be realized in the long run.
When we focus more closely on behavior patterns, the diﬀerences are as follows. When
a player quits the current action and chooses a new action, in Karandikar et al. (1998) and
In-Koo and Matsui (2005), a very simple manner is assumed: all actions can be chosen
with equal probability. In Kim (1999) and Pazgal (1997), a more sophisticated manner is
assumed: players adopt an action that has the largest cumulative payoﬀ rescaled by the
current aspiration level. In that case, players have to remember all past experience in the
past.4 On the other hand, in the present situation, players update one of the valuations
directly at every time, so that players need to remember only two numbers (the valuations
of two actions). Of course, if the situation is more complex, it is too diﬃcult to consider
situations carefully at each choice of action. Karandikar et al. (1993) and In-Koo and
Matsui (2005) are then helpful guides. If the situation is important for the players, they
would adopt the methodology of Kim (1999) and Pazgal (1997). But when the situation
4There is a simple formula for levels of valuations. However, players have to remember the number
of times players choose a particular action.
3is not overly complex and not overly important, the present methodology applies.
The rule of thumb in the present model shares common features with the reinforcement
dynamics of Roth and Erev (1995) and Erev and Roth (1998). Under reinforcement
dynamics there are two endogenous parameters, as here. In the present model, however,
players use a pure strategy except for tie breaking. Under reinforcement dynamics, players
use a mixed strategy and valuations of actions are used as the weight for mixing. Hence,
in our model, players stick ﬁrmly to the current action so long as the valuations indicate
that it is better. In other words, the inertia is stronger than the reinforcement dynamics.
In the coordination game, it is possible that players afraid of frequent changes of action
would send complex signals to the other player. Consequently, a pure strategy assumption
in this model may also be relevant.
The relationship among models are summarized in Table1.
One Endogenous Parameter Two Endogenous Parameters
Pure Strategy Aspiration Model Present Model
Mixed Strategy Reinforcement Model
Table 1: The present model, aspiration model and reinforcement model
In the next section we describe the model. Section 3 presents results. Section 4
sketches the proofs of the results. Section 5 gives concluding comments.
2 The Model




in which we assume that a > c, b > d and a + d < b + c. Both (A;A) and (B;B) are
Nash equilibria, and (A;A) is a Pareto eﬃcient outcome and (B;B) is a risk dominant
outcome.
We also assume that players divided the continuous domain for evaluation into a same
sized grid, and recognize only which sector the payoﬀs or valuations fall in. If we label
all grids with positive integers, then a;b;c;d 2 Z+ where Z+ denotes the set of positive
integers. The players are indexed by i = 1;2. Player i’s state at time t ¸ 0 is deﬁned by
two valuations, for two actions, as (vi
At;vi
Bt). We take all valuations as positive without
loss of generality.5 Initial states are H;L 2 Z+ such that H > a and L < d, and for
i 2 f1;2g, vi
A;0;vi
B;0 2 [L;H]. A (social) state s is the pair of states of Players 1 and 2.





Given Player i’s state at period t, Player i adopts the action that has higher valuation:
x
i










B;t then player i randomizes with mixed probabilities over A and B; that is,
xi
t = with probability p, and xi
t = B with probability 1 ¡ p, where p 2 (0;1). This pair







Player i updates valuations according to the sign of the diﬀerence between ¼ and v.
5If necessary, we can transform payoﬀs and initial valuations by adding large positive numbers to
them.
5Whatever the size of the diﬀerence, the extent of revision for the valuation is constant.
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t 6= ® then vi
®;t+1 retains the same value. This updating rule expresses the fact that
players change their valuations grid by grid; we assume the constant change of valuations.
These updating rules deﬁne a Markov process over the (social) state space deﬁned by
the set [L;H] £ [L;H] £ [L;H] £ [L;H]. Let S be the state space. The process will be
denoted P and be referred to as the untrembled process.
Under the untrembled process there are in general many stationary states. If we
introduce trembles in choosing actions, we can select the most robust outcome against
small perturbations. Let x¤ be the action chosen under the untrembled process, and let
x0 be another action. We assume that each player chooses x¤ with probability 1 ¡ " and
x0 with ", where " is a small positive number less than 1. The process will be denoted
P " and is referred to as the trembled process.
3 Results
We ﬁrst deﬁne the stable states in the untrembled process.
A stable state is such that, for all i;j 2 f1;2g and i 6= j: (1) it induces a pair of
actions (x1;x2); (2) the valuation of the action is exactly equal to the achieved payoﬀ,
so that vi




yi;t where xi 6= ji. We refer to the state as the pure strategy state (PSS),
following (Karandikar et al. 1998). Of course, every PSS is a recurrent class of the
untrembled process by deﬁnition.
For convergence to PSS, we have the following result. To keep the proof simple,
suppose that for any i 2 f1;2g, d · vi
A;0 · a and c · vi
B;0 · b or b · vi
B;0 · c.6 (“PSSs”
will be the plural form of “PSS.”)
Proposition 1
Assume that for any i 2 f1;2g, d · vi
A;0 · a and c · vi
B;0 · b or b · vi
B;0 · c. The
untrembled process converges to particular PSSs. PSSs are constituted only of Pareto
eﬃcient outcomes and risk dominant outcomes.
From the construction of the trembled process, P " is irreducible and aperiodic for
every " > 0. Hence, by standard results for Markov processes, it has a unique stationary
distribution. Denote this by ¹". Any initial distribution converges to it, so that for any
initial distribution d, dP " ! ¹" as t ! 1. According to standard stochastic evolutionary
game analysis (Young 1998, Young 1993, Kandori et al. 1993), lim"!0 ¹" = ¹¤ exists.
If ¹¤(s) > 0, the state s is called stochastically stable, where ¹¤(s) is the probability of
state s given ¹¤. For the probability of the set of states, let ¹"(A) ´
P
s2A ¹"(s).
We derive the following result relating to stochastically stable states:
Proposition 2
Assume that for any i 2 f1;2g, d · vi
A;0 · a and c · vi
B;0 · b or b · vi
B;0 · c. The risk
dominant outcome corresponds to stochastically stable states. Formally, let sR is the set
of states such that v1
B = v2




A. Then lim"!0 ¹"(sR) = 1.
6This assumption is not used in Theorem 1. But it is reasonable if there are some test periods for
deciding valuations based on the realized payoﬀ.
7Next, assume that for i 2 f1;2g, vi
A;0;vi
B;0 2 [L;H]. Under this condition, for any
² > 0, P " is not irreducible. The standard technique cannot therefore be applied in
this case. However, the assertions of Proposition 2 do not change, so that we derive the
following theorem:
Theorem 1 Assume that for any i 2 f1;2g, vi
A;0;vi
B;0 2 [L;H].
(1) The risk dominant outcome corresponds to stochastically stable states in the model.
Formally, let sR is the set of states such that v1
B = v2





Then lim"!0 ¹"(sR) = 1.
(2) Any initial state converges to a stochastically stable state.
4 Informal Sketches of Proofs
All proofs are straightforward but long, and are therefore set out in full in the Appendix.
In this section we describe the intuitive basis of the proofs.
For Proposition 1, if a sequence of states does not enter in the PSS, the sequence
circulates. However, from the way of updating valuations and the tie breaking rule, it is
impossible. In the proof we show that, from arbitrary initial conditions, there is a path
to PSS with positive probability.
For Proposition 2, the range of initial states is restricted. Hence it is easy to derive
the minimum cost tree. The costs from (A;A)-type PSS to (B;B) can be shown to be
less than the costs from (B;B)-PSS to (A;A), by comparing a cost tree whose root is in
(B;B)-PSS and the minimum cost tree whose root is in (A;A)-PSS.
For Theorem 1, the range of initial states is extended. However, there is a unique
recurrent class that is exactly the same as that of Proposition 2. In other words, if a
8state is PSS but is not included in the set of PSS in Proposition 2, then it is transient.
According to standard results for Markov chains, this implies that there exists a unique
limit distribution of P " and, for any transient state, as t ! 1 then its limit distribution
of P " is 0. From these facts it is easy to prove the statement of Proposition 2 under this
assumption, and that there is good convergence from any initial state.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper has examined stochastically stable states in the coordination game that show
a tension between Pareto eﬃciency and risk dominance. In the present model, each agent
has a valuation of the possible actions, which are updated according to a sign of the
diﬀerence between the current valuation and the realized payoﬀ. The agent chooses the
action having higher valuation. In this situation, the risk dominant outcome is selected.
Let us now consider extensions to the analysis. First, the present results and proofs
suppose that the domain of valuations is a positive integer, and that the extent of revision
for the valuation is constant. It is therefore important to consider the case in which the
extent of revision depends on the diﬀerence between the valuation and the realized payoﬀ.
Second, one might assume that the probability of trembling " depends on the state; for
example, it could depend on the diﬀerence between a valuation and the realized payoﬀ.
Third, there is a generalization to a ﬁnite-population model. Finally, we should consider
the appropriateness of the present model in light of the data from experimental analysis.
9Acknowledgment:
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10Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: There are two distinct cases, depending on the payoﬀ structure.
We examine them in turn.
Case 1: a > b > c > d > 0.
We divide all states into nine regions, depending on the valuations (see Table 1).
If the process enters Region 1 or 9, the state converges to PSS. Note that every PSS is
a recurrent class. This is because there are no trembles, so that the relationship between
two valuations does not change. Hence we can show that, from every region, there is a
path to Region 1 or Region 9 with positive probability. Let (x1;x2) be a couple of actions,














B Region 4 Region 5 Region 6
v1
A < v1
B Region 7 Region 8 Region 9
(Convergence to PSS)
Table 2: Regions of pairs of valuations




From the assumptions, for any 0 · t < 1, i 2 f1;2g, then d · vi
A;t · a and
c · vi
B;t · b and all values of valuations are integers. After a ﬁnite number of periods,
the state enters Region 2, Region 5 or Region 6 with probability one.
In Region 2 and 5, by randomization due to tie breaking, (A;A) is chosen with positive
probability. The state then moves into Region 1.
11In Region 6, if v1
B;t < b then, with positive probability, (B;B) is chosen; after that, the
state moves into Region 9. Otherwise, we can construct the following path with positive




B;t are realized. Next,
(B;B) is chosen with positive probability, then the state moves into Region 9.
For Regions 4, 7, 8, a symmetry argument is applied. Hence, from every region, there
is a path to the PSS in Region 1 or 9 with positive probability.
Case 2: a > c > b > d > 0.
We also use Table 1 in this case. By the same argument as in Case 1, every state in
Region 2 and 5 moves into Region 1 with positive probability.
In Region 3, (A;B) is chosen with probability 1. Also, v1
A;t decreases by 1 and v2
B;t
increases by 1 or is equal to c. From the assumption that for any 0 · t < 1, i 2 f1;2g,
it follows that d · vi
A · a and b · vi
B · c and that all values of valuations are integers.
After a ﬁnite number of periods, the state moves into Region 6 with probability one.



























b c or b c or
Figure 1: Description of a state
In Region 6, there are following sub-cases.
12Sub-case 1: Suppose that v1
A;t = v1
B;t = b. We can construct the following sequence





B;t+1 are realized. If v2
A;t+1 = v2
B;t+1, the state is in Region 5 (Figure
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Figure 2: Transitions for states
Sub-case 2: Suppose that v1
A;t = v1
B;t 6= b. Suppose also that v2
B;t · c ¡ 1. First,




B;t+1 are realized. Next,
(B;B) is chosen. After that, v1
A;t+2 = v1
A;t ¡ 1 = v1
B;t+2 = v1





B;t are realized (Figure 3). This shows that Player 1’s valuations decrease by 1
but Player 2’s valuations do not change. If we repeat (A;B) and (B;B) enough times,
then v1
A;¢ = v1
B;¢ = b and v2
A;¢ < v2
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Figure 3: Transitions for states
14Sub-case 3: Suppose that v1
A;t = v1
B;t 6= b. Suppose also that v2
A;t · c ¡ 2 and
v2





are realized. Next, (B;B) is chosen. After that, v1
A;t+2 = v1






B;t+2 = c ¡ 1 are realized (Figure 4). Thereafter we can follow the
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Figure 4: Transitions for states
15Sub-case 4: Suppose that v1
A = v1
B 6= b. Assume also that v2
B = c and v2
A = c¡1. First,




B;t are realized. Next, (B;B) is
chosen. After that, v1
A;t+2 = v1
A;t ¡ 1 = v1
B;t+2 = v1
B;t ¡ 1 and v2
A;t+2 = v2
B;t+2 = c ¡ 1 are
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Figure 5: Transitions for states
For Regions 4, 7, 8, the symmetry argument is used. Hence, in every region, there
16is a path to the PSS in Region 1 or 9 with positive probability. The proposition in this
case is proved.
Note that (B;B) is a PSS, as in the previous case. This is because we can consider
the state in which v1
A;0 = v2
A;0 = d and v1
B;0 = v2
B;0 = b. ¤
Proof of Proposition 2:
By irreducibility of the trembled process, we can use the standard technique (Young
1998). In this technique, cost trees are deﬁned in the set of PSSs, and we ﬁnd the
smallest cost tree. Let (x1;x2)-PSS be a state that it is a PSS, and (x1;x2) is chosen. If
a root of a cost tree is in (x1;x2)-PSSs, then we refer to it as a “(x1;x2)-PSS cost tree.”
By deﬁnition, a cost tree includes all PSSs. If only a sub set of all states are included,
we refer to it as “cost sub-tree”. If only a subset of all (x1;x2)-PSSs is included, we refer
to it as a “(x1;x2)-PSS cost sub-tree.”
States are deﬁned by the valuations made by the two players. If actions are de-











B;t))] in this proof. If time is




B))]. Finally, let (s ! s0)
be a path from state s to s0.
The proof is divided into two diﬀerent cases, depending on the payoﬀ structure.
Case 1: a > b > c > d > 0.
We ﬁrst exhibit two claims used in this proof.
Claim 1: If, for Player i = 1 (or 2), vi
B ¸ c+1 and the state is a (A;A)-PSS then, with
one perturbation, vi
B decreases by one.
This is because the sequence of action choices, (A;B) (or (B;A)) with one perturba-
tion, and (A;A) with no perturbation, gives rise to a situation in which only vi
B decreases
17by one.
Claim 2: If, for Player i = 1 (or 2), vi
A ¸ d+1 and the state is a (B;B)-PSS then, with
one perturbation, vi
A decreases by one.
This is because the sequence of action choices, (B;A) (or (A;B)) with one perturba-
tion, and (B;B) with no perturbation, gives rise to the situation.
Lemma 1: There is a (B;B)-PSS cost tree having cost f(b ¡ c + 1)2 ¡ 1g + (a ¡ c) +
f(b ¡ d)2 ¡ 1g.
Proof of Lemma 1:
Step 1: In this step we construct a (A;A)-PSS cost sub-tree such that the root
is [A;(a;c);A;(a;c)]; it includes all (A;A)-PSSs but not (B;B)-PSSs, and its cost is
(b ¡ c + 1)2 ¡ 1.
Every state in (A;A)-PSSs satisﬁes the following condition: for all i;j 2 f1;2g,
v1
A = v2
A = a and v1
B;v2
B 2 fc;c + 1;:::;bg.
























B ¡ 1);A;(a;c)]) (4)
Since every link has cost one by Claim 1, its cost is (b¡c+1)2¡1(= (b¡c)(b¡c+1)+(b¡c)).
Step 2: In this step we construct a (B;B)-PSS cost sub-tree such that the root
is [B;(d;b);B;(d;b)]; it includes all (B;B)-PSSs but not (A;A)-PSSs, and its cost is
(b ¡ d)2 ¡ 1.
Every state in (B;B)-PSSs satisﬁes the following condition: for all i;j 2 f1;2g,
v1
B = v2
B = b and v1
A;v2
A 2 fd;d + 1;:::;b ¡ 1g.
























A ¡ 1;b);B;(d;b)]) (5)
Since every link has cost one by Claim 2, its cost is (b ¡ d)2 ¡ 1(= (b ¡ d ¡ 1)(b ¡ d) +
(b ¡ d ¡ 1)).
Step 3: In this step we construct a path from [A;(a;c);A;(a;c)] to [B;(c;b);B;(c;b)]
and show that its cost is a ¡ c.
Consider the following transition. First, (A;B) is repeated a¡c times. This transition
takes cost a ¡ c. After this, v1
A = v1
B = c , v2
A = a and v2
B = c are realized (Figure 8).
With no cost, (B;A) is repeated a ¡ c times (Figure 9). Finally (B;B) is repeated b ¡ c
times with no cost, and [B;(c;b);B;(c;b)] is reached (Figure 10). By summing all costs,
a total cost of a ¡ c is required.
By Step1, Step2 and Step 3, we construct a cost tree that satisﬁes the condition of
lemma 1 (Figure11). ¤
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Figure 6: (A;A)-PSS cost sub-tree
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Figure 10: Transitions
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Before stating Lemma 2, we exhibit the following claim, similar to the previous claim.
Claim 3: If vi
A (i 2 f1;2g) increases in (B;B)-PSS, then at least two perturbations are
needed. More precisely, both v1
B and v2
B increase by one.
This is because the only pair of actions that increases vi
A (i 2 f1;2g) is (A;A).
Lemma 2: The minimum cost in the (A;A)-PSS cost trees is f(b ¡ c + 2)2 ¡ 1g + 2 +
f(b ¡ d ¡ 1)(b ¡ d + 2)g.
Proof of Lemma 2:
Step 1: We show the path that the minimum cost tree includes. From the deﬁni-
tion of a cost tree, there is a path to the root from any state. Consider paths from










+f([B;(b;b);B;(b;b)] ! [B;(b + 1;b);A;(b + 1;b)])g (6)
23The ﬁrst term expresses transitions in (B;B)-PSSs. In the transitions, two perturbations
are needed at each transition. In the second term there is no perturbation. Hence the
total cost of this path is 2(b ¡ d).
This path has the minimum cost among paths from [B;(d;b);B;(d;b)] to (A;A)-PSS.
This is because, by Claim 3, there is no redundant transition in this path.
Step 2: In this step we examine the minimum cost tree that includes the path deﬁned
in Step 1.
In the PSSs, at least one perturbation is needed, by deﬁnition. The path in Step
1 is a transition from (B;B)-PSS to (A;A)-PSS. Hence, if the cost tree whose root is
(A;A)-PSS and includes the path in Step 1 is the minimum cost tree, then the other links
need exactly one perturbation.
Step 3: In this step we construct a (A;A)-PSS cost sub-tree such that the root
is [A;(a;c);A;(a;c)]; it includes all (A;A)-PSSs but not (B;B)-PSSs, and its cost is
(b ¡ c + 1)2 ¡ 1.
This result follows from Step 1 of Lemma 1. In this tree, each one-step link needs
exactly one perturbation.
Step 4: In this step we construct a (B;B)-PSS cost sub-tree such that the root is
(B;(b¡1);B;(b¡1;b)); it includes only (B;B)-PSSs but not (A;A)-PSSs, and includes
part of the path in Step 1. Its cost is (b ¡ d ¡ 1)(b ¡ d + 2).




































([B;(vA;b);B;(vA;b)] ! [B;(vA + 1;b);B;(vA + 1;b)])
Since every link in the ﬁrst, second and third terms has one perturbation by Claim
1, its cost is (b ¡ d ¡ 1)(b ¡ d ¡ 1 ¡ 1) + (b ¡ d ¡ 1) + (b ¡ d ¡ 1). Every link in the last
terms has two perturbations by Claim 3, so that its cost is 2(b ¡ d ¡ 1). Hence the total
cost is (b ¡ d ¡ 1)(b ¡ d + 2).
Step 5: In this step we construct a path from [B;(b¡1;b);B;(b¡1;b)] to [A;(a;b);A;(a;b)]
and show its cost is 2.
Consider the following path:
[B;(b ¡ 1;b);B;(b ¡ 1;b)] ! [A;(b;b);A;(b;b)] ! [A;(b + 1;b);A;(b + 1;b)] ! ¢¢¢ (8)
! [A;(a ¡ 1;b);A;(a ¡ 1;b)] ! [A;(a;b);A;(a;b)]
In the ﬁrst transition, two perturbations are needed. In the other transitions there is
no cost, because there is a nonzero probability that both players choose A. Hence the
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Figure 12: (B;B)-PSS cost sub-tree
26total cost of this path is 2.
Step 6: We ﬁnally sum over each of the steps in this argument to prove the lemma.
By collecting all of the links in Step 3, 4 and 5, we generate the cost tree that includes
the path in Step 1 (Figure 13). Each link has exactly unit cost (perturbation) except the
path in Step 1. By Step 2, this is the minimum cost tree in the (A;A)-PSS cost trees.
) , ( A A -pss
cost sub-tree
) , ( B B -pss
cost sub-tree
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1 ) 1 (
2 − + −c b 2 ) 2 )( 1 ( + − − − d b d b
This includes the 
path in Step 1.
Figure 13: a cost tree
From steps 3, 4 and 5, the total cost is f(b¡c+1)2¡1g+f2g+f(b¡d¡1)(b¡d+2)g.
The lemma is proved. ¤
Finally, we prove the statement in Proposition 2 given the condition a > b > c > d >
0. By Lemmas 1 and 2,
[f(b ¡ c + 1)
2 ¡ 1g + fa ¡ cg + f(b ¡ d)
2 ¡ 1g] (9)
¡ [f(b ¡ c + 1)
2 ¡ 1g + f2g + f(b ¡ d ¡ 1)(b ¡ d + 2)g]
= (a ¡ c) ¡ 1 ¡ (b ¡ d)
= f(a + d) ¡ (b + c)g ¡ 1 < 0:
The last inequality follows from the assumption for the tension between eﬃciency and risk
27dominance. This inequality shows that the minimum cost tree has a root of (B;B)-PSS.
That is, a risk dominant outcome is the stochastically stable state. ¤
Case 2: a > c > b > d > 0.
We ﬁrst exhibit two claims used in this proof.
Claim 4: If, for Player i = 1 (or 2), vi
B < c ¡ 1 and the state is one of the (A;A)-PSSs
then, with one perturbation, vi
B increases by one.
This is because the sequence of action choices, (A;B) (or (B;A)) with one perturba-
tion and (A;A) with no perturbation, leads to the situation in which only vi
B increases
by one.
Claim 5: If, for Player i = 1 (or 2), vi
A < d+1 and the state is in (B;B)-PSS then, with
one perturbation, vi
A increases by one.
This is because the sequence of action choices, (B;A) (or (A;B)) with one perturba-
tion and (B;B) with no perturbation, leads this situation.
Lemma 3: There is a (B;B)-PSS cost tree having cost f(c ¡ b + 1)2g + fa ¡ cg + f(b ¡
d)2 ¡ 1g.
Proof of Lemma 3:
Step 1: In this step, we construct a (A;A)-PSS cost sub-tree such that the root
is [A;(a;c);A;(a;c)], it includes all (A;A)-PSSs but not (B;B)-PSSs, and its cost is
(c ¡ b + 1)2 ¡ 1.
Every state in (A;A)-PSSs satisﬁes the following condition: for all i;j 2 f1;2g,
v1
A = v2
A = a and v1
B;v2
B 2 [b;b + 1;:::;c ¡ 1;c].
























B + 1);A;(a;c)]) (10)
Since every link has cost one by Claim 4, its overall cost is (c¡b+1)2 ¡1(= (c¡b)(c¡
b + 1) + (c ¡ b)).
Step 2: In this step we construct a (B;B)-PSS cost sub-tree such that the root
is [B;(d;b);B;(d;b)]; it includes all (B;B)-PSSs but not (A;A)-PSSs, and its cost is
(b ¡ d)2 ¡ 1.
Every state in (B;B)-PSSs satisﬁes the following condition: for all i;j 2 f1;2g,
v1
B = v2
B = b and v1
A;v2
A 2 fd;d + 1;:::;b ¡ 1g.
























A ¡ 1;b);B;(d;b)]) (11)
Since every link has cost one by Claim 5, its overall cost is (b¡d)2 ¡1(= (b¡d¡1)(b¡
d) + (b ¡ d ¡ 1)).
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Figure 14: (A;A)-PSS cost sub-tree
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Figure 15: (B;B)-PSS cost sub-tree
Step 3: In this step, we construct a path from [A;(a;c);A;(a;c)] to [B;(b¡1;b);B;(b¡
1;b)] and show that its cost is (a ¡ c).
Consider the following transition. First (A;A) is repeated a¡c times. This transition
involves a ¡ c costs. After this, v1
A = v1
B = c, v2
A = a and v2
B = c are realized (Figure
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Figure 17: Transitions





decrease by one (Figure 18). If b = c ¡ 1, skip the fourth procedure and go to the ﬁfth





B = b is realized (Figure 19). Fifth, once again (A;B), (B;B), (B;A),
and (B;B) are chosen (Figure 20). Consequently v1
A = v2
A = b ¡ 1 < v1
B = v2
B = b is
realized. The costs occur only in the ﬁrst procedure and are a ¡ c. Hence, the total cost
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Figure 20: Transitions
35Using Step 1, Step 2 and Step 3, we construct a cost tree that satisﬁes the condition
of lemma 3 (Figure 21). ¤
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Figure 21: A cost tree
Before stating Lemma 4, we exhibit the following claim, similar to previous claims.
Claim 6: If vi
A(i 2 f1;2g) increases in (B;B)-PSS, then at least two perturbations are
needed. More precisely, both v1
B and v2
B increase by one.
This is because the only pair of actions that increases vi
A(i 2 f1;2g) is (A;A).
Lemma 4: The minimum cost in (A;A)-PSS cost trees is f(c ¡b +2)2 ¡1g +2+f(b ¡
d ¡ 1)(b ¡ d + 2)g.
Proof of Lemma 4:
Step 1: We show the path that the minimum cost tree can include. From the def-
inition of cost trees, there is a path to the root from any state. Consider paths from










+f([B;(b;b);B;(b;b)] ! [B;(b + 1;b);A;(b + 1;b)])g (12)
The ﬁrst term expresses transitions in (B;B)-PSSs. In the transitions, two perturbations
are needed at each transition. In the second term there is no perturbation. Hence, the
total cost of this path is 2(b ¡ d).
This path has the minimum cost among paths from [B;(d;b);B;(d;b)] to (A;A)-PSS.
This is because, by Claim 6, there is no redundant transition in this path.
Step 2: In this step, we examine the minimum cost tree that includes the path deﬁned
in Step 1. In the PSSs, at least one perturbation is needed, by deﬁnition. The path via
Step 1 is a transition from (B;B)-PSS to (A;A)-PSS. Hence, if the cost tree whose root
is (A;A)-PSS and includes the path in Step 1 is the minimum cost tree, then the other
links involve exactly one perturbation.
Step 3: In this step, we construct a (A;A)-PSS cost sub-tree such that the root is
[A;(a;c);A;(a;c)]; it includes only (A;A)-PSS, and its cost is (b ¡ c + 1)2 ¡ 1.
This result follows from Step 1 of Lemma 1. In this tree, each one-step link needs
exactly one perturbation.
Step 4: In this step, we construct a (B;B)-PSS cost sub-tree such that the root is
(B;(b ¡ 1);B;(b ¡ 1;b)); it includes only (B;B)-PSS and a part of the path in Step 1,
and its cost is (b ¡ d ¡ 1)(b ¡ d + 2).




































([B;(vA;b);B;(vA;b)] ! [B;(vA + 1;b);B;(vA + 1;b)])
Since every link in the ﬁrst, second and third terms has one perturbation by Claim
4, its cost is (b ¡ d ¡ 1)(b ¡ d ¡ 1 ¡ 1) + (b ¡ d ¡ 1) + (b ¡ d ¡ 1). Every link in the last
terms has two perturbations by Claim 6, and its cost is 2(b¡d¡1). Hence the total cost
is (b ¡ d ¡ 1)(b ¡ d + 2).
Step 5: In this step, we construct a path from [B;(b¡1;b);B;(b¡1;b)] to [A;(a;b);A;(a;b)]
and show that its cost is 2.
Consider the following path:
[B;(b ¡ 1;b);B;(b ¡ 1;b)] ! [A;(b;b);A;(b;b)] ! [A;(b + 1;b);A;(b + 1;b)] ! ¢¢¢ (14)
! [A;(a ¡ 1;b);A;(a ¡ 1;b)] ! [A;(a;b);A;(a;b)]
In the ﬁrst transition, two perturbations are needed. In the other transitions there is
no cost, because there is a nonzero probability with which both players choose A. Hence
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Figure 22: (B;B)-PSS cost sub-tree
39the total cost of this path is 2.
Step 6: We sum over the steps to prove the lemma. If we collect all links in Step 3, 4
and 5, it constitutes the cost tree that includes the path in Step 1 (Figure 23). From the
construction, all links have unit cost (perturbation) except the path in Step 1. By Step
2, this is the minimum cost tree in the (A;A)-PSS cost trees.
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path in Step 1.
Figure 23: A cost tree
From steps 3, 4 and 5, the total cost is f(c¡b+1)2¡1g+f2g+f(b¡d¡1)(b¡d+2)g.
This proves the lemma. ¤
Finally, we prove the statement in Proposition 2 under the condition a > c > b > d >
0. By Lemmas 3 and 4,
[f(c ¡ b + 1)
2 ¡ 1g + fa ¡ cg + f(b ¡ d)
2 ¡ 1g] (15)
¡ [f(c ¡ b + 1)
2 ¡ 1g + f2g + f(b ¡ d ¡ 1)(b ¡ d + 2)g]
= (a ¡ c) ¡ 1 ¡ (b ¡ d)
= f(a + d) ¡ (b + c)g ¡ 1 < 0:
The last inequality follows from the assumption for the tension between Pareto eﬃciency
40and risk dominance. This inequality shows that the minimum cost tree has a root of
(B;B)-PSS. That is, a risk dominant outcome is the stochastically stable state. ¤
Proof of Theorem 1:
We can extend Proposition 2 directly by standard techniques (Young 1998).
First, we describe Young’s deﬁnition and theorem.
Deﬁnition (Young 1998, p. 54)
Let P " be a Markov process on S. We call P " a regular perturbed Markov process if P "
is irreducible for " 2 (0;"¤], and for every s;s0 2 S, P "
ss0 approaches P 0
ss0 at an exponential
rate; that is, lim"!0 P "
ss0 = P 0
ss0, and if P "




"r(s;s0) for some r(s;s0).
Young’s Theorem (Young 1998, Theorem 3.1, p. 153)
Let P " be a regular perturbed Markov process. Assume that P " has a unique recurrent
class.7
(1) There exists a unique stationary distribution (¹") of P " for each " > 0.8 That is,
¹"P " = ¹".
(2) lim"!0 ¹" = ¹0 exists, and ¹0 is a stationary distribution of P 0.
(3) The stochastically stable states are precisely those states that are contained in the
recurrent class(es) of P 0 having minimum stochastic potential.
The minimum stochastic potential means that the cost tree constructed among recur-
rent classes with a root of the state has minimum cost.
7In Young (1998), this is not assumed, but it is assumed that ¹¤ is the unique stationary distribution
of P".
8This is derived from that there is the unique stationary distribution if and only if P" has a unique
recurrent class (Young 1998, p. 49).
41In our model, the condition of irreducibility is violated. We therefore use the following
deﬁnition and theorem.
Deﬁnition A.1
Let P " be a regular perturbed Markov process on S, and let ˜ P " be a Markov process on
˜ S = S [ Z such that, for any s 2 Z, s is transient and S is a unique recurrent class of













We call this Markov process, ˜ P ", an enlarged regular perturbed Markov process. If " ! 0,
it approachs ˜ P 0 at an exponential rate, so that
˜ P













Let P " be a regular perturbed Markov process, and let ¹¤ be the unique stationary
distribution of P " for each " > 0. Let ˜ P " be an enlarged regular perturbed Markov
process.
(1) ˜ ¹" = (¹";0) is a unique stationary distribution of ˜ P " for each " > 0, where 0 is a
zero vector having size jZj.
(2) lim"!0 ˜ ¹" = ˜ ¹0 exists, where ˜ ¹0 = (¹0;0). Here, ˜ ¹0 is a stationary distribution of
˜ P 0.
42(3) The stochastically stable states are precisely those states that are contained in the
recurrent class(es) of P 0 having minimum stochastic potential. That is, stochasti-
cally stable states under the original regular perturbed Markov process P " on S are
equal to stochastically stable states under the enlarged regular perturbed Markov
process ˜ P " on ˜ S.
Proof:
(1) From standard properties of Markov process, the stationary distribution of the














where 0 is a vector whose size is jZj. From the assumption of an enlarged regular
perturbed Markov process, there is unique recurrent class. This shows that there is a
unique stationary distribution, ˜ ¹" = (¹";0); that is, ˜ ¹" ˜ P " = ˜ ¹".
(2) By Young’s theorem, lim"!0 ¹" exists and ¹0 is a stationary distribution of P 0.
Hence, by (1), lim"!0 ˜ ¹0 exists and ˜ ¹0 is a stationary distribution of ˜ P 0, where ˜ ¹0 =
(¹0;0).
(3) From (1) and (2), any state s 2 Z does not have strictly positive value in the
stationary distribution. Note also that ¹0 is the same limit distribution in Young’s
Theorem. ¤
In Young’s Theorem and Theorem A.1, aperiodicity is not assumed, because only
stationary distribution is involved. It is well known that aperiodicity carries the good
convergence property that, for any initial distribution d, dP " ! ¹" as t ! 1.
We next set out the corresponding result.
43Proposition A.1
Let ˜ P " be an enlarged regular perturbed Markov process. Then, for any initial distribu-
tion ˜ d,
(1) limt!1 ˜ d ˜ P " = ˜ ¹",
(2) lim"!1 limt!1 ˜ d ˜ P " = ˜ ¹0(´ (¹0;0)).
Proof:



































From the standard properties of Markov processes, if j is transient, then for any i 2 ˜ S,
limn!1 pn

















44Next, we examine Q"(n)
























































¯ ¯ ¯¹j ¡ ˜ p
"(n)
ij






¯ ¯ ¯¹j ¡ ˜ p
"(k)
lj






¯ ¯ ¯¹j ¡ ˜ p
"(k)
lj
¯ ¯ ¯: (26)
By equation (20), if 1 · l · jSj then limk!1 ˜ p"(k)
lj = limn!1 ˜ p"k
lj = ¹j. From equation
(21), if jSj + 1 · l · j˜ Sj then limm!1 ˜ p"(m)
il = 0.
Therefore, for any ± > 0, there exist k¤ and m¤ such that for any m > m¤ and k > k¤,
¯ ¯ ¯¹j ¡ ˜ p
"(n)
ij






¯ ¯ ¯¹j ¡ ˜ p
"(k)
lj






¯ ¯ ¯¹j ¡ ˜ p
"(k)
lj
¯ ¯ ¯ < ±: (27)
45That is, for jSj + 1 · i · j˜ Sj and 1 · j · jSj, limn!1 ˜ p"(n)
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= ˜ d ¢
0
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In the last equation, because ˜ d is a distribution, the sum of all elements in ˜ d is 1. ¤
Under the extended initial condition, the Markov process is an enlarged regular per-
turbed Markov process. From Theorem A.1 and Proposition 2, we have (1) of Theorem
1. By Proposition A.1, we have (2) of Theorem 1. ¤
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